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Argued June 23, 1998 
 
BEFORE: GREENBERG, ALITO, and McKEE, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed October 13, 1998) 
 
These findings, which are amply supported by the record, 
demonstrate a lack of objective economic consequences 
arising from ACM's offsetting acquisition and virtually 
immediate disposition of the Citicorp notes.33 On November 
3, 1989, ACM invested $175 million of its cash in private 
placement Citicorp notes paying just three basis points 
more than the cash was earning on deposit, then sold the 
same notes 24 days later for consideration equal to their 
purchase price, in a transaction whose terms had been 
finalized by November 10, 1989, one week after ACM 
acquired the notes.34 These transactions, which generated 
the disputed capital losses by triggering the application of 
the ratable basis recovery rule, offset one another with no 
net effect on ACM's financial position. Examining the 
sequence of ACM's transactions as a whole as we must in 
assessing their economic substance, see Court Holding Co., 
324 U.S. at 334, 65 S.Ct. at 708; Weller, 270 F.2d at 297, 
we find that these transactions had only nominal, 
incidental effects on ACM's net economic position. 
 
Viewed according to their objective economic effects 
rather than their form, ACM's transactions involved only a 
fleeting and economically inconsequential investment in 
and offsetting divestment from the Citicorp notes. In the 
course of this brief interim investment, ACM passed $175 
million of its available cash through the Citicorp notes 
before converting 80% of them, or $140 million, back into 
cash while using the remaining 20%, or $35 million, to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. Because we find that the lack of objective economic consequences of 
ACM's transactions, which is evident from the Tax Court's well- 
supported factual findings, is essential to assessing whether the 
transaction's tax consequences may be disregarded and lends significant 
support to the court's ultimate finding that ACM's transactions did not 
have sufficient substance to be recognized for tax purposes, we proceed 
to conduct this portion of the economic substance analysis although the 
Tax Court did not do so explicitly. See Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 
115 F.3d at 510 (holding that court of appeals may affirm Tax Court 
decisions on any grounds found in the record regardless of Tax Court's 
rationale). 
 
34. The consideration consisted of $140 million in cash and LIBOR notes 
whose present value was $34,410,814, or $35,000,000, reduced by the 
transaction costs established by Merrill Lynch. 
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acquire an amount of LIBOR notes that was identical, apart 
from transaction costs, to the amount of such notes that 
ACM could have acquired by investing its $35 million in 
cash directly into such assets. Thus, the transactions with 
respect to the Citicorp notes left ACM in the same position 
it had occupied before engaging in the offsetting acquisition 
and disposition of those notes. 
 
Just as the taxpayer in Gregory engaged in offsetting 
transactions by creating a new corporation, transferring 
stock to the corporation, transferring the stock back out of 
the corporation and then liquidating the corporation, just 
as the taxpayers in Knetsch and Weller engaged in 
offsetting transactions by acquiring annuity policies and 
borrowing back virtually their entire value, and just as the 
taxpayers in Lerman and the other property disposition 
cases engaged in inconsequential transactions by disposing 
of property while retaining the opportunity to reacquire the 
same or virtually identical property at the same price, so 
ACM engaged in mutually offsetting transactions by 
acquiring the Citicorp notes only to relinquish them a short 
time later under circumstances which assured that their 
principal value would remain unchanged and their interest 
yield would be virtually identical to the interest yield on the 
cash deposits which ACM used to acquire the Citicorp notes.35 
 
Gregory requires us to determine the tax consequences of 
a series of transactions based on what "actually occurred." 
293 U.S. at 469, 55 S.Ct. at 267. Just as the Gregory Court 
found that the intervening creation and dissolution of a 
corporation and transfer of stock thereto and therefrom was 
a "mere device which put on the form of a corporate 
reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
35. The variable rate on the Citicorp notes presented a theoretical 
possibility that the consequences of owning those notes would vary from 
the consequences of leaving ACM's funds on deposit at a rate of interest 
virtually identical to the initial rate on the Citicorp notes. However, 
ACM's exposure to any fluctuation in the rate of return on its Citicorp 
note investment was illusory, as the interest rates were scheduled to be 
reset only once per month and ACM had arranged to hold the notes for 
only 24 days, encompassing only one interest rate adjustment on 
November 15 that would affect the notes for only 12 days before their 
disposition. See 73 T.C.M. at 2200. 
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character" which amounts to a mere "transfer .. . of 
corporate shares to the [taxpayer]," so we find that ACM's 
intervening acquisition and disposition of the Citicorp notes 
was a mere device to create the appearance of a contingent 
installment sale despite the transaction's actual character 
as an investment of $35 million in cash into a roughly 
equivalent amount of LIBOR notes.36 Thus, the acquisition 
and disposition of the qualifying private placement Citicorp 
notes, based upon which ACM characterized its 
transactions as a contingent installment sale subject to the 
ratable basis recovery rule, had no effect on ACM's net 
economic position or non-tax business interests and thus, 
as the Tax Court properly found, did not constitute an 
economically substantive transaction that may be respected 
for tax purposes. See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469-70, 55 S.Ct. 
at 267-68; Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 366; Lerman, 939 F.2d 44; 
Weller, 270 F.3d at 297.37 
 
ACM contends that the Tax Court was bound to respect 
the tax consequences of ACM's exchange of Citicorp notes 
for LIBOR notes because, under Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. 
Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 111 S.Ct. 1503 (1991), an 
exchange of property for "materially different" assets is a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. ACM emphasizes that the total consideration it was to receive in 
exchange for the Citicorp notes genuinely was contingent, in substance 
as well as in form, because the amount depended on afluctuating 
market variable "precisely [as] the statute and the regulations 
anticipated." Br. at 31-32. However, the receipt of genuinely contingent 
payments is necessary but not sufficient to trigger the application of the 
ratable basis recovery rule which applies only in the context of a 
contingent installment sale. Absent an economically substantive 
disposition of qualifying property, the transactions do not constitute a 
bona fide contingent installment sale within the meaning of the 
provisions which ACM seeks to invoke. See I.R.C. SS 453(b), 453(k); 
Temp. Treas. Reg. S 15a.453-1(c). 
 
37. As discussed above, each of these cases involved objective acts which 
satisfied the technical requirements of the Internal Revenue Code 
provisions that the taxpayer sought to invoke, but which the courts 
disregarded for tax purposes because they lacked any net effect on the 
taxpayer's economic position or non-tax business interests. Accordingly, 
we are unpersuaded by ACM's argument that its transactions must be 
regarded as economically substantive because it actually and objectively 
engaged in them. See br. at 21. 
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substantive disposition whose tax effects must be 
recognized. We find Cottage Savings inapposite. The 
taxpayer in that case, a savings and loan association, 
owned fixed-rate mortgages whose value had declined as 
interest rates had risen during the preceding decade. The 
taxpayer simultaneously sold those mortgages and 
purchased other mortgages which were approximately equal 
in fair market value, but far lower in face value, than the 
mortgages which the taxpayer relinquished. The Court 
found that the exchange for different mortgages of 
equivalent value afforded the taxpayer "legally distinct 
entitlements," and thus was a substantive disposition 
which entitled the taxpayer to deduct its losses resulting 
from the decline in value of the mortgages during the time 
that the taxpayer held them. Id. at 566, 111 S.Ct. at 1511. 
 
The distinctions between the exchange at issue in this 
case and the exchange before the Court in Cottage Savings 
predominate over any superficial similarities between the 
two transactions. The taxpayer in Cottage Savings had an 
economically substantive investment in assets which it had 
acquired a number of years earlier in the course of its 
ordinary business operations and which had declined in 
actual economic value by over $2 million from 
approximately $6.9 million to approximately $4.5 million 
from the time of acquisition to the time of disposition. See 
Cottage Sav., 499 U.S. at 557-58, 111 S.Ct. at 1506. The 
taxpayer's relinquishment of assets so altered in actual 
economic value over the course of a long-term investment 
stands in stark contrast to ACM's relinquishment of assets 
that it had acquired 24 days earlier under circumstances 
which assured that their principal value would remain 
constant and that their interest payments would not vary 
materially from those generated by ACM's cash deposits.38 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
38. In Lerman, 939 F.2d at 55-56 & n.14, we observed that Cottage 
Savings involved the relinquishment of assets whose value had declined 
by over $2 million. Because the transaction in Cottage Savings brought 
about the realization of a $2 million economic loss resulting from the 
disposition of depreciated assets in which the taxpayer had an 
economically substantive investment, we reject ACM's contention, see 
reply br. at 15, that the case recognized as an economically substantive 
loss any tax loss arising from a transaction in which the taxpayer 
disposes of property in an arms'-length transaction. The Cottage Savings 
Court had no occasion to address a transaction like that before us in 
which the taxpayer relinquished property after a minimal holding period 
with no intervening change in economic value. 
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While the dispositions in Cottage Savings and in this case 
appear similar in that the taxpayer exchanged the assets 
for other assets with the same net present value, beneath 
this similarity lies the more fundamental distinction that 
the disposition in Cottage Savings precipitated the 
realization of actual economic losses arising from a long- 
term, economically significant investment, while the 
disposition in this case was without economic effect as it 
merely terminated a fleeting and economically 
inconsequential investment, effectively returning ACM to 
the same economic position it had occupied before the 
notes' acquisition 24 days earlier.39 
 
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Cottage Savings, 
deductions are allowable only where the taxpayer has 
sustained a " `bona fide' " loss as determined by its 
" `[s]ubstance and not mere form.' " 499 U.S. at 567-68, 111 
S.Ct. at 1511 (quoting Treas. Reg. S 1.165-1(b)). According 
to ACM's own synopsis of the transactions, the contingent 
installment exchange would not generate actual economic 
losses. Rather, ACM would sell the Citicorp notes for the 
same price at which they were acquired, see app. at 275- 
77, 321, 300, generating only tax losses which offset 
precisely the tax gains reported earlier in the transaction 
with no net loss or gain from the disposition. See app. at 
301.40 Tax losses such as these, which are purely an 
artifact of tax accounting methods and which do not 
correspond to any actual economic losses, do not constitute 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
39. ACM contends that its disposition of the Citicorp notes was 
substantive because it "relinquished the benefits and burdens of owning 
the Citicorp notes for the distinct benefits and burdens of owning $140 
million of cash and the LIBOR notes." Br. at 28. This argument, 
however, erroneously assumes that ACM had acquired the benefits and 
burdens associated with the Citicorp notes in an economically 
substantive sense, when in reality ACM's brief investment in and 
offsetting divestment from these assets exposed ACM only to de minimis 
risk of changes in principal value or interest rates. 
 
40. The participation of a foreign partner that was impervious to tax 
considerations and that claimed most of the reported gains while 
allocating to Colgate virtually all of the losses allowed Colgate as ACM's 
major U.S. partner to reap the benefits of the tax losses without 
sustaining the burdens of the offsetting tax gains. 
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the type of "bona fide" losses that are deductible under the 
Internal Revenue Code and regulations. 
 
While ACM contends that "it would be absurd to 
conclude that the application of the Commissioner's own 
[ratable basis recovery] regulations results in gains or 
losses that the Commissioner can then deem to be other 
than `bona fide,' " reply br. at 14, its argument confounds 
a tax accounting regulation which merely prescribes a 
method for reporting otherwise existing deductible losses 
that are realized over several years with a substantive 
deductibility provision authorizing the deduction of certain 
losses. In order to be deductible, a loss must reflect actual 
economic consequences sustained in an economically 
substantive transaction and cannot result solely from the 
application of a tax accounting rule to bifurcate a loss 
component of a transaction from its offsetting gain 
component to generate an artificial loss which, as the Tax 
Court found, is "not economically inherent in" the 
transaction. 73 T.C.M. at 2215.41 Based on our review of 
the record regarding the objective economic consequences 
of ACM's short-swing, offsetting investment in and 
divestment from the Citicorp notes, we find ample support 
for the Tax Court's determination that ACM's transactions 
generated only "phantom losses" which cannot form the 
basis of a capital loss deduction under the Internal 
Revenue Code.42 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
41. Because the ratable basis recovery rule simply provides a method for 
reporting otherwise existing economically substantive losses, we find it 
irrelevant that the rule recognizes that its application could 
"inappropriately defer or accelerate recovery of the taxpayer's basis," 
resulting in " `substantial distortion' " of the tax consequences realized 
in 
any particular year of a transaction. See ACM br. at 32-34 (quoting 
Temp. Treas. Reg. SS 15a.453-1(c)(3), (c)(7)). While the rule contemplates 
some distortion as to the timing of when actual gains or losses are 
reported over the span of a contingent installment sale, it does not 
contemplate the reporting of losses which are not the bona fide result of 
an economically substantive transaction. Thus, contrary to ACM's 
argument, the tax losses it reported are not "precisely what the 
[regulations] intended." See br. at 33. 
 
42. Having found ample support for the Tax Court's conclusion that 
ACM's transactions lacked economic substance and thus cannot give rise 
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3. Subjective Aspects of the Economic Sham Analysis 
 
In making its determination that it did "not find any 
economic substance" in ACM's transactions, the Tax Court 
relied extensively on evidence that the transactions were 
not intended to serve any "useful non-tax purpose" and 
were not reasonably expected to generate a pre-tax profit. 
See 73 T.C.M. at 2215, 2229. ACM contends, br. at 34, that 
the Tax Court improperly conducted a "generic tax- 
independent" inquiry into the non-tax purposes and 
potential pre-tax profitability of the transaction based on a 
misapplication of Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469, 55 S.Ct. at 267. 
According to ACM, the Tax Court mistook Gregory's 
scrutiny of the "business or corporate purpose" behind the 
transaction for a universally applicable aspect of the 
economic substance analysis when in reality, ACM 
contends, Gregory undertook this inquiry only because the 
specific Internal Revenue Code provision there at issue 
required that the transaction be effected "pursuant to a 
plan of reorganization." See br. at 20-23 (citing Gregory, 
293 U.S. at 469, 55 S.Ct. at 267). Thus, ACM argues, the 
Tax Court erred in considering the intended purpose and 
expected profitability of the transactions in this case where 
the relevant provisions providing for the gain or loss on 
sales or exchanges of property, I.R.C. S 1001, and for the 
treatment of installment sales, I.R.C. S 453, do not require 
a particular business purpose or profit motive. See id. 
 
We disagree, and find that the Tax Court's analysis 
properly rested on economic substance cases applying 
provisions which, like those relevant in this case, do not by 
their terms require a business purpose or profit motive. In 
Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 736 (2d Cir. 
1966), the court analyzed the economic substance of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to taxable gains or deductible losses regardless of how those gains and 
losses are allocated, we need not address the Commissioner's alternative 
argument that the tax consequences of the transaction must be 
disregarded because ACM's partnership structure artificially "bifurcat[ed] 
the tax consequences of the transaction" by allocating taxable gains to 
a foreign partner and offsetting tax losses to the taxpayer in a manner 
which the relevant statute and regulations did not intend. See br. at 32- 
34. 
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transaction under I.R.C. S 163(a), which provides, in purely 
objective terms without reference to a business purpose or 
profit motive, that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction 
all interest paid or accrued within a taxable year on 
indebtedness." The Goldstein court acknowledged that this 
broad language did not require "that the deductible interest 
serve a business purpose, that it be ordinary and 
necessary, or even that it be reasonable," but found that 
the language did not permit deductions arising from a 
transaction that had "no substance or purpose aside from 
the taxpayer's desire to obtain the tax benefit of an interest 
deduction." Id. at 741-42. Thus, the court found, the 
taxpayer was not entitled to deduct her substantial interest 
charges, although they had accrued in an arms'-length 
transaction, because she had incurred the underlying debt 
for the sole purpose of generating a tax deduction to offset 
other income.43 
 
Likewise, in Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, we considered and 
rejected the taxpayer's argument that a transaction need 
not further any non-tax objectives or hold any profit 
potential where the governing statutory provisions do not 
"require that the deductions they provide for arise from 
transactions having a business purpose or profit motive." 
Id. at 122. Despite the broad statutory language allowing 
the deduction of "all interest paid or accrued . . . on 
indebtedness," I.R.C. S 163(a), we concluded that interest 
charges were not deductible if they arose from a transaction 
"entered into without expectation of economic profit and 
[with] no purpose beyond creating tax deductions." Id. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
43. ACM seeks to distinguish Goldstein on the grounds that it involved 
a transaction which lacked objective economic effect because 
"economically, [the taxpayer's] activities netted zero." However, contrary 
to ACM's contention that it "bore all of the benefits and burdens of the 
ownership of . . . the Citicorp Notes and then the cash and LIBOR Notes, 
and stood to recognize true economic gain or loss from holding those 
assets," reply br. at 5-6, we find that the critical parts of ACM's 
transactions also "netted zero" because its acquisition and offsetting 
disposition of the Citicorp notes had no net effect on its economic 
position. Thus, we reject ACM's attempt to distinguish Goldstein which, 
like the Tax Court opinion in this case, analyzed the taxpayer's intended 
purposes as well as the transaction's economic effects. 
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123-24 (citations omitted). We emphasized that interest 
payments "are not deductible where the underlying 
transaction has no purpose other than tax avoidance" even 
if the governing statutory language "had no express 
business-purpose requirement." Id. at 124 (citations 
omitted).44 Thus, we find no merit in ACM's argument that 
the Tax Court erred as a matter of law by scrutinizing the 
asserted business purposes and profit motives behind 
ACM's transactions, and we turn to the question of whether 
the court erred in finding that the transactions were not 
intended to serve ACM's professed non-tax purposes and 
were not reasonably expected to generate a pre-tax profit. 
 
4. Intended Purposes and Anticipated Profitability of ACM's 
Transactions 
 
Before the Tax Court, ACM conceded that there were tax 
objectives behind its transactions but contended that "tax- 
independent considerations informed and justified each 
step of the strategy." 73 T.C.M. at 2217. ACM asserted that 
its transactions, in addition to presenting "a realistic 
prospect that ACM would have made a profit" on a pre-tax 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
44. Because the intended purposes behind a transaction are relevant in 
assessing its economic substance even where the statute is drafted in 
broad terms that do not require a particular intent or purpose, we are 
unpersuaded by ACM's argument that its transactions must be 
respected as economically substantive because I.R.C.S 1001, which 
provides for the recognition of gain or loss "on the sale or exchange of 
property" was intended to encompass "all exchanges." See br. at 23-25 
(citing H.R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., at 13 (1924)). ACM 
emphasizes, br. at 25-27, that the Supreme Court in Cottage Savings, 
499 U.S. 554, 111 S.Ct. at 1503, recognized the tax effects of a 
disposition that was motivated solely by tax considerations and was not 
expected to generate a pre-tax profit. As discussed above, however, the 
transaction in Cottage Savings had objective economic substance 
because it resulted in the realization of actual economic losses arising 
from a $2 million decline in market value of the property exchanged. 
Where such objective economic effects are lacking, scrutiny of the 
subjective intent behind the transactions becomes an important means 
of determining whether the transactions constitute a scheme with "no 
purpose other than tax avoidance" that may not give rise to deductible 
losses even where the statute contains no express requirement that the 
transaction serve a non-tax business purpose. Wexler, 31 F.3d at 124. 
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basis, also served the tax-independent purposes of 
providing an interim investment until ACM needed its cash 
to acquire Colgate debt and a hedge against interest rate 
risk within the partnership. The Tax Court, however, found 
that the record did not support ACM's assertions that the 
transactions were designed either to serve these non-tax 
objectives or to generate a pre-tax profit, see 73 T.C.M. at 
2217-29, and for the following reasons, we agree. 
 
a. Interim Investment 
 
ACM contends that it invested in the Citicorp notes not 
only because they qualified for treatment under the 
contingent installment sale provisions and the ratable basis 
recovery rule, but also because they served as an 
appropriate interim investment until ACM could invest in 
the Colgate debt whose acquisition, according to ACM, was 
a central objective of the partnership. The Tax Court, 
however, rejected this contention on the grounds that ACM 
did not acquire the Citicorp notes as an interim investment 
"to accommodate the timing of the acquisition of Colgate 
debt; rather, it was the reverse: The acquisition of the 
Colgate debt was timed so as to accommodate the 
requirements of the section 453 investment strategy" which 
required ACM to acquire and dispose of private placement 
notes. 73 T.C.M. at 2227. This conclusion finds abundant 
support in the record. 
 
In May 1989, Merrill Lynch presented Colgate with an 
initial proposal of partnership transactions intended to 
generate capital losses which Colgate could use to offset 
1988 capital gains. Although Merrill Lynch had not yet 
incorporated the concept of using the partnership to 
acquire Colgate debt issues as it did in its subsequent July 
28 and August 17 proposals, its May proposal nonetheless 
contemplated the acquisition and imminent disposition of 
short-term securities, with no intervening change in their 
economic value, in exchange for contingent installment 
notes. See 73 T.C.M. at 2191; app. at 678-79, 275-77. The 
fact that the acquisition and disposition of short-term notes 
were central parts of the proposed partnership transactions 
even before the formulation of non-tax partnership 
objectives belies ACM's contention that its contingent 
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installment exchange of Citicorp notes was designed to 
accommodate the timing of its debt acquisition strategy. 
 
Moreover, as early as October 3, 1989, one month before 
ACM was formed, Pohlschroeder reported that he had 
identified the Met notes as targets for acquisition and that, 
"pursuant to an inquiry to Metropolitan, we feel confident 
that the partnership can purchase sufficient Colgate debt" 
to serve the partnership's objectives. App. at 314. Yet, 
despite this confidence that the debt was available for 
purchase well in advance of ACM's formation, 
Pohlschroeder did not recommend that the partnership 
invest its funds directly in the identified debt issues or 
finalize the terms of the anticipated debt purpose, but 
rather identified as the "Next Steps" after formation of the 
partnership "Short-term investment securities acquired. . . . 
Disposition of short term investment securities to fund 
acquisition of Colgate debt." App. at 321. In accordance 
with this plan, ACM did not take any measures to pursue 
the prompt purchase of these debt issues upon its receipt 
of $205 million in cash contributions on November 2, 1989, 
but rather, acting through Colgate, instructed Metropolitan 
to attend a November 17 meeting to discuss the terms of 
the sale. See 73 T.C.M. at 2227.45  Thus, we agree with the 
Tax Court's finding that any delay preceding the 
opportunity to acquire Colgate debt was of ACM's own 
deliberate making and was intended so that ACM could 
engage in the tax-motivated acquisition and disposition of 
qualifying short-term notes in the contingent installment 
sale that had been contemplated since before Merrill Lynch 
and Colgate devised the concept of incorporating debt 
acquisition objectives into Merrill Lynch's initial tax 
reduction proposal. 
 
Even if ACM had faced a delay before it could purchase 
Colgate debt and thus needed to locate a suitable interim 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
45. Pohlschroeder's handwritten memorandum of October 19 indicating 
that the Met Note acquisition would proceed on November 17 and that 
the Long Bond and Euro Note acquisitions would proceed after 
acquisition of the Citicorp notes further supports the Tax Court's 
determination that ACM delayed the acquisition of the debt issues to 
accommodate its tax-driven strategy of acquiring and disposing of private 
placement notes in a contingent installment sale. See 73 T.C.M. at 2200. 
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investment, the Citicorp notes ill served the professed 
purpose of holding cash assets in anticipation of an 
impending purchase. The notes, which in order to qualify 
for treatment in a contingent installment sale could not be 
traded on an established market, see I.R.C. S 453(k)(2)(A), 
were highly illiquid and thus could not be converted back 
into the cash needed to purchase Colgate debt without 
significant transaction costs in the form of the bid-ask 
spread which Merrill Lynch deemed necessary to market 
the notes to third parties. These transaction costs rendered 
the illiquid Citicorp notes paying 8.78% significantly less 
advantageous as an interim investment than the fully liquid 
cash deposit account paying 8.75%. Accordingly, wefind no 
error in the Tax Court's conclusion that ACM's brief 
investment in the Citicorp notes was motivated by the 
pursuit of the tax advantages of a contingent installment 
sale rather than by a need for an interim investment 
pending its acquisition of Colgate debt. See 73 T.C.M. at 
2227-29. 
 
b. Hedge Against Interest Rate Risk 
 
The Tax Court also rejected ACM's contention that it 
invested in LIBOR notes not only because they generated 
the contingent payments necessary to trigger the 
application of the ratable basis recovery rule, but also 
because they were an appropriate hedge against the 
interest rate exposure brought about by ACM's investment 
in Colgate debt issues. As the court explained, ACM's 
asserted rationale of hedging against other assets within 
the partnership would "defeat [the] very purpose" which 
Colgate had advanced for pursuing a debt acquisition 
partnership in the first instance. 73 T.C.M. at 2222. The 
court accurately noted that Colgate had entered into the 
partnership based on a prediction of falling interest rates 
and had justified its plan to acquire fixed-rate Colgate debt 
issues on the grounds that as interest rates declined, these 
issues would appreciate in value to ACM as the obligee, 
thus offsetting, through Colgate's share in ACM, the 
increased burdens that Colgate effectively would sustain as 
the obligor on those instruments if market interest rates fell 
further below the fixed rate established on these 
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obligations. See 73 T.C.M. at 2192-93, 2221-25; app. at 
311, 666-68, 880-82, 2762-63, 2765, 2769-70. 
 
While the acquisition of Colgate debt furthered this 
professed goal of decreasing the exposure associated with 
Colgate's fixed rate long term debt structure outside of the 
partnership, the acquisition of the LIBOR notes, whose 
value would decline as interest rates declined, conversely 
increased ACM's exposure to falling interest rates, offsetting 
the desired effect of the debt acquisition program which 
purportedly was a fundamental partnership objective. See 
T.C.M. at 2221; app. at 311. Accordingly, the LIBOR notes, 
by hedging against the Colgate debt issues acquired within 
the partnership, negated the potential benefit of ACM's 
acquisition of these issues as a hedge against Colgate's 
interest rate exposure outside the partnership. 
 
The fact that the interest rate exposure resulting from the 
LIBOR notes undermined rather than furthered the 
partnership's purported debt management objectives is also 
evident from the fact that Colgate reserved the option under 
the partnership agreement to elect to increase its share in 
changes in the value of the Colgate debt issues attributable 
to fluctuations in market interest rates, and exercised this 
option on several occasions. See app. at 101. Because the 
value of the fixed-rate Colgate debt issues increased in 
inverse proportion to interest rates, Colgate's exercise of 
this option reflects a prediction of falling interest rates 
which would result in risk to Colgate through its liabilities 
outside the partnership but would benefit Colgate through 
its interest in the assets held within the partnership. The 
acquisition of LIBOR notes, whose value depended in direct 
proportion on interest rates, effectively would dilute the 
benefits which the partnership was intended to yield and 
which Colgate sought to maximize by exercising its options 
under the partnership agreement. Thus, we find 
considerable support in the record for the Tax Court's 
conclusion that the acquisition of the LIBOR notes operated 
to "defeat [the] very purpose" which ACM had advanced as 
a tax-independent justification for its sequence of 
investments. 
 
Although ACM meticulously set forth, in 
contemporaneously recorded documents, tax-independent 
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rationales for each of its transactions with respect to the 
Citicorp notes and LIBOR notes,46 these stated rationales 
cannot withstand scrutiny in light of the stated purposes 
behind the partnership itself, because the investment in the 
Citicorp notes impeded rather than advanced ACM's 
professed goal of making its cash available to acquire 
Colgate debt issues, just as the investment in the LIBOR 
notes impeded rather than advanced the professed goal of 
acquiring partnership assets that would hedge against 
Colgate's exposure to declining interest rates outside the 
partnership.47 Accordingly, wefind no error in the Tax 
Court's determination that the transactions "served no 
useful non-tax purpose," 73 T.C.M. at 2229, and thus 
constituted the type of scheme with "no purpose other than 
tax avoidance" that lacks the economic substance 
necessary to give rise to a deductible loss. Wexler, 31 F.3d 
at 124.48 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
46. See app. at 386-87 (authorizing investment in "private placement" 
notes as an investment "pending the acquisition" of Colgate debt issues); 
app. at 391 (recommending sale of Citicorp notes to generate cash 
needed to acquire Colgate debt and acquisition of LIBOR notes to hedge 
risks associated with Colgate debt); app. at 397 (advising reduction of 
LIBOR note holdings in light of reduced need for hedging within 
partnership); app. at 408-09 (recommending disposition of remaining 
"highly volatile" LIBOR notes in light of Colgate's increased partnership 
interest which eliminated need for hedge within partnership). 
 
47. The rationales set forth in ACM's contemporaneous records are 
particularly implausible in light of the documents prepared between May 
and October 1989, before ACM's formation, which propose an identical 
sequence of transactions far in advance of the events which, according 
to memoranda and minutes recorded during the operation of the 
partnership, prompted each ensuing step in the series of transactions. 
See 71 T.C.M. at 2191; app. at 678-79, 275-79, 310-21, 296-308. 
 
48. While ACM purported to combine the tax avoidance objectives of 
Merrill Lynch's initial May 1989 proposal with the non-tax debt 
acquisition objectives incorporated into subsequent proposals, ACM's 
pursuit of these two distinct objectives within the same partnership 
cannot obscure the fact that the contingent installment exchange, which 
was solely responsible for the tax consequences at issue, was executed 
independently of, did not further, and in fact impeded ACM's pursuit of 
its non-tax debt acquisition objectives, because the Citicorp notes placed 
the cash needed to acquire Colgate debt into illiquid instruments whose 
 
                                51 
 
 
 
c. Anticipated Profitability 
 
In addition to rejecting ACM's asserted non-tax 
justifications for its sequence of investments and 
dispositions, the Tax Court also rejected ACM's contention 
that its transactions were reasonably expected to yield a 
pre-tax profit because the court found ACM had planned 
and executed its transactions without regard to their pre- 
tax economic consequences. See 73 T.C.M. at 2217-21. The 
evidence in the record overwhelmingly supports this  
conclusion.49 The documents outlining the proposed 
transactions, while quite detailed in their explication of 
expected tax consequences, are devoid of such detailed 
projections as to the expected rate of return on the private 
placement notes and contingent payment notes that were 
essential components of each proposal. See 73 T.C.M. at 
2191; app. at 678-79, 263-79, 296-308.50  
 
Moreover, ACM's partners were aware before they entered 
the partnership that the planned sequence of investments 
would entail over $3 million in transaction costs. See app. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
disposition cost ACM several million dollars in transaction costs while 
the purchase of the LIBOR notes increased exposure to falling interest 
rates, diminishing the desired effects of the debt acquisition strategy. 
Thus, the non-tax motivations behind ACM's debt purchase do not alter 
the fact that the contingent installment sale was motivated only by tax 
avoidance purposes. 
 
49. ACM, citing Sacks v. Commissioner, 69 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 1995), 
argues that a transaction need not be profitable in order to be respected 
for tax purposes. See br. at 24 & n.30. Sacks, however, held that, 
"[w]here a transaction has economic substance, it does not become a 
sham merely because it is likely to be unprofitable on a pre-tax basis," 
and found that the transaction had economic substance because it 
involved a sale and leaseback of equipment used for legitimate business 
purposes and it resulted in concrete changes in the parties' economic 
positions. See 69 F.3d at 990-92. Thus, Sacks is inapposite in this case 
where the contingent installment exchange served no non-tax business 
purposes and did not materially alter ACM's economic position. 
 
50. According to these documents, the capital gains realized in the first 
year of the transaction would equal the aggregate capital losses realized 
in the ensuing years, reflecting no net economic change. See app. at 279, 
300-301, 305-08. 
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at 294. Yet Colgate, which effectively bore virtually all of 
these costs pursuant to the terms of the partnership 
agreement, did not attempt to assess whether the 
transactions would be profitable after accounting for these 
significant transaction costs. See 73 T.C.M. at 2217-18, 
2204. Furthermore, while ACM planned to dispose of the 
Citicorp notes after a brief holding period for an amount 
equal to their purchase price, see app. at 275-77, 300, 321, 
its proposed transactions contemplated holding for two 
years the LIBOR notes whose principal value would decline 
in the event of the falling interest rates which ACM's 
partners predicted. See app. at 311, 753-55. 
 
Thus, while the Citicorp note investment which was 
essential to structuring the transaction as a contingent 
installment sale was economically inconsequential, the 
LIBOR note investment which was equally essential to 
achieving the desired tax structure was economically 
disadvantageous under the market conditions which 
Colgate predicted and which actually transpired. ACM's 
lack of regard for the relative costs and benefits of the 
contemplated transaction and its failure to conduct a 
contemporaneous profitability analysis support the Tax 
Court's conclusion that ACM's transactions were not 
designed or reasonably anticipated to yield a pre-tax profit, 
particularly in view of the significant transactions costs 
involved in exchanging illiquid private placement 
instruments. See Hines v. United States, 912 F.2d 736, 739 
(4th Cir. 1990).51 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
51. ACM, citing its expert's opinion that ACM could have earned a profit 
at market interest rates of 8%, see br. at 38 & n.47, contends that the 
Tax Court erred in concluding that ACM could not have expected to earn 
a profit from its transactions "under any reasonable forecast of future 
interest rates." 73 T.C.M. at 2219. However, in assessing the anticipated 
profitability of a transaction, tax courts properly may disregard 
computations, such as those presented by ACM's expert, that were 
prepared in the context of the litigation and which "had not entered into 
[the taxpayer's] calculations at the outset" of the transaction. 
Goldstein, 
364 F.2d at 740. Because nothing in the record resembles a profitability 
calculation conducted at the inception of the transaction, we find no 
error in the Tax Court's determination that ACM's transactions were not 
designed to generate a profit. 
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In light of the Tax Court's well-founded conclusion that 
Colgate and ACM expected interest rates to decline, 
rendering the proposed transactions unprofitable, we find it 
immaterial whether, as ACM contends, the court overstated 
the degree to which interest rates would have had to rise in 
order for ACM to recover its transaction costs. See br. at 
42-43. Even accepting ACM's assertion that it could have 
recovered its costs upon a significantly smaller rise in 
interest rates than that calculated by the Tax Court, this 
assertion is immaterial in the event of falling interest rates 
and at best demonstrates a prospect of a nominal, 
incidental pre-tax profit which would not support a finding 
that the transaction was designed to serve a non-tax profit 
motive. See Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738, 768 
(1990).52 
 
Furthermore, we find no merit in ACM's assertion that 
the Tax Court improperly based its determination that the 
transactions were unprofitable for Colgate on the erroneous 
assumption that Colgate, directly and through 
Southampton, "would continue to own only 17 percent of 
ACM's assets," causing it to understate the profits Colgate 
would receive toward the end of the transactions when it 
would own 99.7% of the partnership. See br. at 39.53 As 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
52. Similarly, the evidence that neither Colgate nor ACM reasonably 
expected to gain any pretax profit from the transaction or even 
attempted to formulate a profitability projection compels us to reject 
ACM's contention that the Tax Court's profitability analysis improperly 
rested on a finding that ACM could have made greater profits with less 
risk by pursuing alternative investments. See br. at 46. While Lemmen 
v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1326, 1346 n.29 (1981), on which ACM relies, 
emphasized that a business venture may constitute an activity engaged 
in for profit within the meaning of I.R.C. S 183 even when other types of 
ventures may have been more profitable, this proposition does not 
preclude the Tax Court from considering, in its analysis of whether there 
was a profit motive behind ACM's transactions, that the decision to 
exchange Citicorp notes for LIBOR notes involved substantial transaction 
costs, entailed significant risks given the anticipated falling interest 
rates, and compared unfavorably to the higher profitability and lower 
risk of the 8.75% cash deposit accounts which ACM affirmatively 
relinquished to pursue this strategy. 
 
53. ACM contends that the Tax Court erred by examining the 
transactions' anticipated profitability from Colgate's perspective, 
contrary 
 
                                54 
 
 
 
discussed above, however, neither ACM nor any of its 
partners reasonably anticipated any profits resulting from 
the relevant transactions, which entailed an economically 
inconsequential investment in Citicorp notes and a 
decidedly unprofitable investment in LIBOR notes whose 
value would be expected to decline under 
contemporaneously predicted market conditions. Because 
the contingent installment exchange transaction, as 
contemplated and as actually executed, yielded no 
partnership profits in any amount, Colgate's percentage 
share of those non-existent profits is immaterial.54 
 
Even assuming, however, that ACM and its partners 
expected to earn some measure of profits upon disposition 
of the BOT LIBOR notes, any additional portion of these 
profits that would redound to Colgate's benefit due to its 
increased share in the partnership cannot be characterized 
as an additional return on Colgate's investment in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to the principle that the expected profitability of partnership 
transactions 
must be determined "at the partnership level, rather than at the level of 
the partners." Br. at 36. However, as we explained in Simon v. 
Commissioner, 830 F.2d 499, 507 (3d Cir. 1987), 
 
       [a]lthough the existence of a profit objective of a partnership is 
       determined at the partnership level, . . . a partnership is merely 
a 
       formal entity, and a determination of profit objective can only be 
       made with reference to the actions of those . . . who manage the 
       partnership affairs. . . . . [Therefore] the Tax Court did not 
misapply 
       the profit objective test at the partnership level by looking to 
the 
       motives and actions of those individuals that organized, structured 
       and conducted [partnership] operations. 
 
In this case where ACM and its transactions were structured around 
Colgate's objectives and where Colgate was to hold a 99.7% stake in any 
eventual partnership profits, see 73 T.C.M. at 2190-97, 2217-19, 2221, 
we find no error in the Tax Court's examination of Colgate's prospects for 
profit as a means of analyzing ACM's prospects for profit. 
 
54. ACM argues, br. at 9, that each of ACM's partners realized a positive 
pre-tax return on its investment in ACM. However, we reject ACM's 
attempt to equate net partnership profits with profits resulting from the 
contingent installment exchange which gave rise to the tax consequences 
at issue and which the Tax Court properly found, based on ample 
evidence in the record, was not reasonably anticipated to generate a 
profit. See 73 T.C.M. at 2218-19. 
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partnership assets because Colgate, directly and through 
Southampton, paid well over $100 million to acquire its 
increased partnership interest. See app. at 137, 769-70.55 
These additional contributions far exceeded Colgate's initial 
partnership investment of $35 million, undermining ACM's 
assertion that any additional returns attributable to 
Colgate's increased stake in the partnership properly may 
be characterized as further returns on Colgate's interest in 
the partnership's investments. Thus, we are unpersuaded 
by ACM's contention that the Tax Court distorted its 
profitability analysis by failing to account for Colgate's 
increased partnership interest. 
 
ACM also argues that the Tax Court's profitability 
analysis was flawed because the court adjusted the income 
expected to be generated by the LIBOR notes to its net 
present value. See br. at 43. In support of its assertion that 
this net present value adjustment constitutes reversible 
error, ACM cites Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 
412 (1985), which noted that the issue of present value 
adjustments was "not raised or briefed by the parties" and 
held that absent some statutory guidance, it would not 
discount the residual value of obsolete partnership assets 
at the time of obsolescence to their equivalent present 
values at the time the partnership was formed. The court 
reasoned that discounting to present value effectively would 
require that the taxpayer's investment yield a rate of return 
exceeding the discount rate which, the court found, would 
contravene the admonition in Treas. Reg. S 1.183-2(b)(9) 
that "the availability of other investments which would yield 
a higher return, or which would be more likely to be 
profitable, is not evidence that an activity is not engaged in 
for profit" within the meaning of I.R.C. S 183. See 84 T.C. 
at 440 n.52. 
 
We reject ACM's contention that Estate of Thomas, which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
55. On June 25, 1991, Colgate paid Kannex $85,897,203 and 
Southampton paid Kannex $15 million to purchase a portion of Kannex's 
share in the partnership. On November 27, 1991, ACM redeemed 
Kannex's remaining partnership interest at a cost of $100,775,915 which 
Colgate borrowed against the partnership assets it was to acquire. See 
app. at 137, 769-70. 
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construed Treasury Regulations under I.R.C. S 183, 
precludes present value adjustments in the prospect-for- 
profit analysis under the judicially created economic 
substance doctrine.56 In transactions that are designed to 
yield deferred rather than immediate returns, present value 
adjustments are, as the courts have recognized, an 
appropriate means of assessing the transaction's actual 
and anticipated economic effects. See, e.g., Hilton v. 
Commissioner, 671 F.2d 316, 317 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming 
economic substance determination based on present value 
analysis of taxpayer's investments); Citizens & Southern 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 498 (1988) (noting that 
value of an acquired asset may be determined based on 
future income likely to be generated that by that asset 
discounted to present value), aff'd, 919 F.2d 1992 (11th 
Cir. 1990); Gianaris v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1229, 1234 (1992) ("we have consistently discounted . . . 
income streams produced by [an investment] in 
determining whether the taxpayer had a profit objective") 
(citations omitted). 
 
We find no basis in the law for precluding a tax court's 
reliance on a present value adjustment where such an 
adjustment, under the surrounding circumstances, will 
serve as an accurate gauge of the reasonably expected 
economic consequences of the transaction. In this case 
where ACM's transactions essentially converted readily 
available cash, with only a brief interim investment in the 
Citicorp notes, into a stream of deferred payments, we find 
that the present value adjustment played an appropriate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
56. ACM also cites City of New York v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 481, 487 
(1994), aff 'd, 70 F.3d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1995), which analyzed whether 
I.R.C. S 141, in setting forth statutory distinctions based on the amount 
of bond proceeds forwarded to private parties, referred to these amounts 
in absolute terms or as adjusted to present value. The court concluded 
that "time value of money concepts can be applied only in the presence 
of a legislative directive to do so" and found no indication that Congress 
intended to refer to adjusted amounts. Id. (citation omitted). Because the 
issue of whether to imply a net present value adjustment in an amount 
specified in the Internal Revenue Code is distinct from the issue of 
whether to consider net present value as a variable in a profitability 
analysis under the economic substance doctrine, wefind City of New 
York inapposite. 
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role in the Tax Court's analysis of the potential profitability 
of the transactions. We accordingly find no error in this 
aspect of the court's analysis. 
 
ACM also avers that the Tax Court erred in excluding 
from its profitability analysis "the pre-tax income resulting 
from the investment of $140 million of cash received as 
part of the consideration for the Citicorp Notes." Br. at 44. 
We disagree. The Tax Court properly analyzed the 
profitability of the transactions whose economic substance 
is at issue, namely the contingent installment exchange of 
Citicorp notes for LIBOR notes which gave rise to the 
disputed tax consequences. Any profits arising from ACM's 
investment of $140 million in cash into Colgate debt issues 
did not result from the contingent installment exchange 
whose economic substance is in issue. Because this sum of 
cash in fact represents the portion of the proceeds from the 
Citicorp notes which ACM did not invest in the contingent 
installment exchange of the other $35 million in Citicorp 
notes for contingent-payment LIBOR notes, any profits 
derived from these funds cannot be characterized as profits 
arising from the contingent installment exchange. Thus, the 
Tax Court properly excluded these profits from its analysis 
of the profitability of the contingent installment sale which 
gave rise to the disputed capital losses.57 We find ample 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
57. For similar reasons, we reject ACM's contention, see br. at 45, that 
the Tax Court erroneously excluded from its profitability analysis the 
gains derived from the portion of the Citicorp notes which ACM held 
until October 1991 instead of exchanging them for LIBOR notes. These 
notes, like the $140 million cash proceeds of the Citicorp note 
disposition, were not involved in the exchange for contingent-payment 
notes. Thus, any profits generated thereby may not be considered to be 
profits arising from the contingent installment sale. In fact, the 
profitability of holding the Citicorp notes until 1991 when they could be 
tendered to the issuer at par, ensuring recovery of their principal value, 
only highlights the lack of reasonably anticipated profitability in 
exchanging these notes for the LIBOR notes whose principal value was 
at risk in the projected declining interest rate market. We also are 
unpersuaded by ACM's contention, see id., that the Tax Court, having 
excluded from its profitability analysis the gains from the Citicorp notes 
held until 1991, erred by failing to exclude from its calculations a 
portion of the transaction costs arising from the partnership transactions 
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support in the record for the Tax Court's conclusion that 
ACM and its partners did not reasonably anticipate that its 
contingent installment sale would generate a pre-tax profit. 
Because ACM's acquisition and disposition of the Citicorp 
notes in a contingent installment exchange was without 
objective effect on ACM's net economic position or non-tax 
objectives, and because its investments in the Citicorp 
notes and LIBOR notes did not rationally serve ACM's 
professed non-tax objectives or afford ACM or its partners 
a reasonable prospect for pre-tax profit, we will affirm the 
Tax Court's determination that the contingent installment 
exchange transactions lacked economic substance and its 
resulting decision providing that the capital gain and loss 
at issue will not be recognized and thus disallowing 
deductions arising from the application of the contingent 
installment sale provisions and the ratable basis recovery 
rule. 
 
B. Actual Economic Losses 
 
Following the entry of the Tax Court's opinion holding 
that ACM's contingent installment sale did not have 
sufficient economic substance to be recognized for tax 
purposes, the parties submitted memoranda pursuant to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
as a whole. See id. Even if we were to subtract the 15% pro rata portion 
of the transaction costs that ACM suggests were attributable to the 15% 
of ACM's $205 million in Citicorp notes which were not exchanged in the 
contingent sale, the resulting increase in the net yield from ACM's 
transactions, totaling under $0.5 million, would not support the 
conclusion that these transactions portended a reasonable prospect for 
profit, particularly in light of the evidence that ACM and its partners 
made no attempt to assess the transactions' profitability after 
transaction costs. In any event, the Tax Court properly declined to 
allocate a pro rata portion of the overall transaction costs to the 
portion 
of the Citicorp notes which were put to Citicorp at par in 1991, because 
the most significant portion of the transaction costs arose in the course 
of negotiating the structured transaction and bid-ask spread required to 
market the illiquid private placement notes to third parties in the 
contingent installment exchange and to remarket the LIBOR notes, and 
thus was not properly attributable to the notes which ACM retained and 
put to Citicorp in 1991. 
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Tax Court Rule 155 regarding the proper computation of 
tax liabilities to be allocated by ACM pursuant to that 
opinion. ACM argued that even if it was not entitled to 
deduct the entire $84,997,111 in tax losses it had reported, 
it was entitled to deduct the approximately $6 million 
"portion of its loss that is not attributable to the installment 
sale accounting and that reflects the actual economics of 
the transactions in issue." App. at 3386; see also app. at 
3348-51, 3385-98. The court rejected ACM's argument and 
entered a final decision disallowing all deductions arising 
from ACM's transactions as well as the 1989 capital gain. 
See app. at 3444. ACM contends that the Tax Court 
erroneously failed to recognize that ACM's ownership of the 
LIBOR notes had economic substance even if the 
contingent installment sale did not, and thus improperly 
disallowed deductions arising from its ownership of those 
notes, resulting in inconsistent tax treatment in light of 
ACM's reporting of the income generated by those notes.58 
We agree. 
 
In Lerman, 939 F.2d at 45, we held that a transaction 
that lacks economic substance "simply is not recognized for 
federal taxation purposes, for better or for worse," and we 
are not aware of any cases applying the economic 
substance doctrine selectively to recognize the 
consequences of a taxpayer's actions for some tax purposes 
but not others. Rather, the courts have applied economic 
substance principles to "give effect either to both the cost 
and the income functions [of a transaction], or to neither." 
Seykota v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1116, 1118 
(1991); accord Sheldon, 94 T.C. at 762 (denying interest 
deduction and accordingly holding that income items 
should not be recognized); Arrowhead Mountain Getaway, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
58. Contrary to the Commissioner's suggestion, br. at 49, ACM 
adequately raised before the Tax Court its contention that, as gain from 
the LIBOR notes was recognized, it was entitled to deduct the 
corresponding economic losses on those notes. See app. at 3386 
("[d]isallowing the loss from the sale of the LIBOR Notes would be 
inconsistent with recognizing the income from the payments under the 
Notes"); id. at 3390 (arguing that Commissioner "should not be permitted 
to . . . cause the recognition of . . . income and then disregard the same 
transactions in order to deny a loss"). 
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Ltd. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1805, 1822 (1995) 
(holding that because transactions were economic shams 
that could not give rise to deductions, amounts received in 
the course of those transactions could not be characterized 
as taxable income), aff'd, 119 F.3d 80 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(table). Thus, we must set aside the Tax Court's decision to 
the extent that it disallowed the deduction of all losses, 
including actual economic losses, associated with the 
LIBOR notes without adjusting for the taxes paid on the 
approximately $2.3 million of interest income generated by 
the same notes. See app. at 3444, 3390. 
 
While it is clear that the income and loss aspects of the 
LIBOR notes must be treated consistently with one another, 
this proposition does not resolve whether the consistency 
should be achieved by disregarding the tax consequences of 
the income generated by the notes or by permitting the 
deduction of actual economic losses associated with the 
notes. ACM urges us to adopt the latter position and in 
support thereof invokes Wexler, 31 F.3d at 127, in which 
we held that "in some circumstances, a sham transaction 
may have separable, economically substantive, elements 
that give rise to deductible interest obligations." According 
to ACM, br. at 48, its ownership of the BOT LIBOR notes 
and its 1991 disposition thereof for an actual economic loss 
gave rise to a separable, economically substantive loss that 
is properly deductible under Wexler because it is distinct 
from the losses resulting from the ratable basis recovery 
rule. The Commissioner, on the other hand, contends that 
Wexler does not permit the deduction of ACM's economic 
losses on the LIBOR notes because, according to the 
Commissioner's interpretation of Wexler, a separable item 
of loss is not deductible unless the underlying transaction 
had a potential non-tax benefit. See br. at 48-49. 
 
For the following reasons, we find ACM's contentions to 
be more persuasive. In Wexler, the taxpayer invoked Rice's 
Toyota, 752 F.2d at 95-96, which disallowed depreciation 
and interest deductions arising from a transaction that was 
a sham in that the taxpayer "subjectively lacked a business 
purpose and the transaction objectively lacked economic 
substance." The court found, however, that one discrete 
portion of the transaction, which entailed the exchange of 
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a recourse note for "something of economic value," had 
sufficient economic substance to give rise to an interest 
deduction. Id. at 95-96. Distinguishing Rice's Toyota, we 
found that the claimed deductions in Wexler did not 
constitute such a "separable, economically substantive" 
item that was distinct from the sham aspects of the 
transaction, but rather constituted "the principal tax 
benefits of the transaction." Wexler, 31 F.3d at 125. Thus, 
we found, allowance of the deduction would have permitted 
the taxpayer "to reap the entire benefit of its sham 
transaction" by allowing him the deduction "that was the 
centerpiece of the whole scheme." Id. at 127. 
 
Such is not the case here. The actual economic losses 
associated with ACM's ownership of the LIBOR notes are 
both economically substantive and separable from the 
sham aspects of the underlying transaction. Far from being 
the "centerpiece" or "principal tax benefit" of the underlying 
transaction, the approximately $6 million in economic 
losses which ACM seeks to deduct were separate and 
distinct from the $87 million tax loss that did not 
correspond to any actual economic loss but rather was an 
artifact of the ratable basis recovery rule which inflated the 
tax basis of the LIBOR notes well above their actual cost 
basis. In contrast to its economically inconsequential 
acquisition and disposition of the Citicorp notes, ACM's 
ownership of the BOT LIBOR notes, which extended over 
two years under circumstances that posed an actual risk to 
the principal value of that investment, had an economically 
substantive impact on ACM's net financial position. In 
these circumstances, recognition of both the income and 
the loss aspects of ACM's investment in those notes will 
result in consistent tax treatment which accurately reflects 
the economic reality of ACM's transactions and will allow 
deduction only of a "separable, economically substantive" 
item that is not the "centerpiece" of the transactions, 
consistently with our holding in Wexler. 
 
While the Commissioner, br. at 48, urges us to read 
Wexler more broadly to preclude any deductions associated 
with an underlying transaction found to be a sham, we 
decline to do so. We recognize that Wexler not only 
distinguished Rice's Toyota on its facts, but also criticized 
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its reasoning. In doing so, however, Wexler did not criticize 
Rice's Toyota's essential holding that "in some 
circumstances, a sham transaction may have separable, 
economically substantive elements that give rise to 
deductible" liabilities, see 31 F.3d at 127, but rather 
disagreed with the Rice's Toyota court'sfinding that the 
recourse note portion of the transaction, which the court 
had described as "a `fee' for purchase of expected tax 
benefits," had economic substance. As we explained in 
Wexler, by the Rice's Toyota court's own description, that 
transaction had no non-tax consequences and served no 
non-tax purposes and thus could not be considered 
economically substantive even if it was separable from the 
central aspects of the underlying sham. See Wexler, 31 
F.3d at 125 (quoting Rice's Toyota, 752 F.2d at 94). 
 
ACM's possession of the LIBOR notes, although not 
intended to serve non-tax purposes, had significant non-tax 
economic effects, consisting of several million dollars in 
actual economic losses. As we acknowledged in Wexler, 
even where a transaction is not intended to serve business 
purposes, it may give rise to a deduction to the extent that 
it has objective economic consequences apart from tax 
benefits. See 31 F.3d at 126 (citing Jacobson, 915 F.2d at 
849); see also Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469, 55 S.Ct. at 267 
(holding that if the transaction "in reality was effected" in 
substance as well as in form, "the ulterior [tax avoidance] 
purposes . . . will be disregarded); Northern Indiana Pub. 
Serv. Co., 115 F.3d at 512 (holding that Gregory and its 
progency "do not allow the Commissioner to disregard 
economic transactions . . . which result in actual, non-tax- 
related changes in economic position" regardless of "tax- 
avoidance motive"). Thus, we are unpersuaded by the 
Commissioner's assertion that Wexler requires us to 
disregard actual, objective economic losses merely because 
they are incidental to a broader series of transactions that 
are found to constitute an economic sham whose principal 
tax benefits must be denied. See br. at 48-49. Because 
ACM's possession and disposition of the LIBOR notes was 
distinct from the contingent installment exchange which 
constituted the underlying sham transaction and because 
this distinct portion of the transaction had sufficient non- 
tax economic effect to be recognized as economically 
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substantive, we find that this aspect of ACM's transactions 
gave rise to the type of "separable, economically 
substantive" loss that is deductible even when incurred in 
the context of a broader transaction that constitutes an 
economic sham. Wexler, 31 F.3d at 127. Accordingly, we 
will reverse the Tax Court's decision to the extent that it 
disallowed the deductions arising from the actual economic 
losses which ACM sustained upon its disposition of the 
LIBOR notes. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Tax Court's 
application of the economic substance doctrine and its 
resulting decision eliminating the capital gains and losses 
attributable to ACM's application of the contingent 
installment sale provisions and the ratable basis recovery 
rule. The Commissioner's cross appeal is moot and thus 
will be dismissed. We will, however, reverse the Tax Court's 
decision insofar as it disallowed the deductions arising from 
the actual economic losses associated with ACM's 
ownership of the LIBOR notes, and will remand to the Tax 
Court for entry of a decision consistent with this opinion. 
The parties will bear their own costs on this appeal. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
By finding that ACM's sales of the Citicorp notes for cash 
and LIBOR Notes "satisfied each requirement of the 
contingent installment sales provisions and the ratable 
basis recovery rule," Maj. Op. at 28, yet, simultaneously 
subjecting these transactions to an economic substance 
and sham transaction analysis, the majority has ignored 
the plain language of IRC S 1001, and controlling Supreme 
Court precedent. We have injected the "economic 
substance" analysis into an inquiry where it does not 
belong. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
ACM, like all taxpayers, has the absolute right to 
decrease or to avoid the payment of taxes so long as that 
goal is achieved legally. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 
468 (1935). Id. In Gregory, the taxpayer wanted to transfer 
stock from her wholly-owned corporation to herself, but 
realized that a direct distribution of those shares would be 
a taxable event. Therefore, in an attempt to avoid a taxable 
event, the taxpayer created a new corporation, transferred 
the stock to that new corporation, and then caused the new 
corporation to distribute the stock to her in liquidation. The 
taxpayer owned all of the stock of United Mortgage 
Corporation, and that corporation owned 1000 shares of 
the Monitor Securities Corporation that the taxpayer 
wanted to obtain. In order to do so without paying the taxes 
that would clearly be due on a direct transfer, she 
engineered a purported reorganization of United Mortgage 
Corporation. The Supreme Court described her scheme as 
follows: 
 
       To that end, she caused the Averill Corporation to be 
       organized under the laws of Delaware on September 
       18, 1928. Three days later, the United Mortgage 
       Corporation transferred to the Averill Corporation the 
       1,000 shares of Monitor stock, for which all the shares 
       of the Averill Corporation were issued to the petitioner. 
       On September 24, the Averill Corporation was 
       dissolved, and liquidated by distributing all its assets, 
       namely, the Monitor shares, to the petitioner. No other 
       business was ever transacted, or intended to be 
       transacted, by that company. The petitioner 
       immediately sold the Monitor shares. . . . 
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Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added). At the time, 26 
USCA S 112 (g) exempted the gain realized from a corporate 
reorganization "[i]f there is distributed, in pursuance of a 
plan of reorganization, to a shareholder, . . . stock . . . in 
such corporation." Id. at 468. Most significantly for our 
purposes, the Court stated the issue as follows: "[b]ut the 
question for determination is whether what was done, apart 
from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute 
intended." Id. at 469. The Court concluded that what was 
done was not what the statute intended because the 
liquidation was not a plan of reorganization at all, but "a 
transfer of assets by one corporation to another in 
pursuance of a plan having no relation to the business of 
either. . . ." Id. Accordingly, the Court disregarded the 
transaction, even though the form of the transaction 
satisfied the literal requirements of the IRC's reorganization 
provisions, because it found that the entire transaction was 
nothing but "an elaborate and devious form of conveyance 
masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing 
else." Id. at 470. In other words, the transaction was one 
which "upon its face lies outside the plain intent of the 
statute." Id. Consequently, "the rule which excludes from 
consideration the motive of tax avoidance" did not apply. Id. 
 
Accordingly, I am not as persuaded as my colleagues that 
Gregory should guide our inquiry into these transactions. 
Here, the sales of the Citicorp Notes for cash and LIBOR 
Notes were clearly "legitimate" sales in the nontax sense. 
Under IRC S 1001, the tax consequences of a gain or loss in 
the value of property are deferred until the taxpayer realizes 
the gain or loss. Cottage Savings Assoc. v. Commissioner, 
499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991). The concept of "realization" is 
implicit in IRC S 1001(a), Id., and the realized gain is 
recognized when the property is sold or exchanged. IRC 
S 1001(c).1 In Cottage Savings, the Court held that a sale or 
exchange of property is a realization event "so long as the 
exchanged properties are `materially different' -- that is, so 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. IRC S 1001(c) provides: "(c) Recognition of Gain or Loss. -- Except as 
otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or 
loss, 
determined under this section, on the sale or exchange of property, shall 
be recognized." 
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long as they embody legally distinct entitlements.' Id. at 
566. 
 
       Cottage Savings sold 90% participation in 252 
       mortgages to four S&L's. It simultaneously purchased 
       90% participation interests in 305 mortgages held by 
       these S&L's. All of the loans involved in the transaction 
       were secured by single-family homes. . . . 
 
        On its 1980 federal income tax return, Cottage 
       Savings claimed a deduction . . . which represented the 
       adjusted difference between the face value of the 
       participation interests that it traded and the fair 
       market value of the participation interests it received. 
       . . . 
 
Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 557. It was not disputed that 
"[t]he . . . acknowledged purpose [of the transfers] was to 
facilitate transactions that would generate tax losses but 
that would not substantially affect the economic position of 
the transacting S&L's". Id. at 556. In allowing the taxpayer 
to deduct the resulting loss the Court reasoned that S 1001 
did not recognize exchanges "commonly known as `like 
kind', and that Congress therefore intended to afford tax 
recognition of gains and losses resulting from exchanges of 
property that was materially different." Id., at 564. The 
Court held "[u]nder our interpretation of S 1001(a), an 
exchange of property gives rise to a realization event so long 
as the exchanged properties are `materially different' -- that 
is, so long as they embody legally distinct entitlements." Id. 
That is what happened here, and I believe that, under 
Cottage Savings, the tax loss here should have been 
allowed. 
 
ACM's sales of the Citicorp Notes for cash and LIBOR 
Notes resulted in the exchange of materially different 
property with "legally distinct entitlements.". Consequently, 
the sales were substantive dispositions, and the tax effects 
of those transactions should be recognized. Cottage 
Savings, as well as the plain language of IRC S 1001, 
demands that result. 
 
Thus, I do not think that the many cases decided before 
Cottage Savings that the majority relies upon are helpful. 
e.g., Maj. Op. at 26-34. Similarly, I do not believe our 
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inquiry is furthered by discussing United States v. Wexler, 
31 F.3d 117 (3rd Cir. 1994). See Maj. Op. at 45. There, we 
were not addressing the issue of sham transactions in the 
context presented here, nor did we cite Cottage Savings. We 
did cite Lerman v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 
1991), and we noted that, in Lerman, we said " `economic 
substance is a prerequisite to any Code provision allowing 
deductions.' " 31 F.3d at 127 (quoting Lerman, 939 F.2d at 
48 & n. 6, 52). However, it is the definition of "economic 
substance" that is the sticking point. Here, the "economic 
substance" inquiry must be governed by the "material 
difference requirement" of Cottage Savings, not by the tax 
avoidance intent of the taxpayers. 
 
In this regard, I believe the majority mischaracterizes the 
appellant's argument. The majority states: "ACM 
acknowledges that even where the `form of the taxpayer's 
activities indisputably satisfie[s] the literal requirements' of 
the statutory language, the courts must examine `whether 
the substance of those transactions was consistent with 
their form' ". Maj. Op. at 29 (quoting Appellant's Br. at 21). 
However, ACM is referring to the issue as posed by Gregory 
v. Helvering. In referring to the facts of that case, ACM 
argues: 
 
       The form of the taxpayer's activities indisputably 
       satisfied the literal requirements of the Code's 
       reorganization provisions, but the question was 
       whether the substance of those transactions was 
       consistent with their form. As he does here, the 
       Commissioner argued in Gregory that the taxpayer's 
       ulterior purpose should be disregarded. . . . 
 
        In other words, the focus should be on the substance 
       of what was done, and not on why it was done. The 
       Supreme Court then analyzed the specific statutory 
       language concerning reorganizations and concluded 
       that the taxpayer's actions lay outside the plain intent 
       of the statute. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 21. 
 
As recited earlier, ACM's sales of the Citicorp Notes for 
cash and LIBOR Notes resulted in the exchange of 
materially different property. I believe our inquiry should 
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proceed no further, and reverse the holding of the Tax 
Court eliminating the capital gains and losses attributable 
to ACM's application of the contingent installment sale 
provisions and the ratable basis recovery rule to its 
disposition of the Citicorp Notes. 
 
I can't help but suspect that the majority's conclusion to 
the contrary is, in its essence, something akin to a"smell 
test." If the scheme in question smells bad, the intent to 
avoid taxes defines the result as we do not want the 
taxpayer to "put one over." However, the issue clearly is not 
whether ACM put one over on the Commissioner, or used 
LIBOR notes to "pull the wool over his eyes." The issue is 
whether what ACM did qualifies for the tax treatment it 
seeks under S 1001. The fact that ACM may have"put one 
over" in crafting these transactions ought not to influence 
our inquiry. Our inquiry is cerebral, not visceral. To the 
extent that the Commissioner is offended by these 
transactions he should address Congress and/or the 
rulemaking process, and not the courts.2  
 
Accordingly I must dissent from what I admit is a very 
finely crafted opinion by my colleague, Judge Greenberg. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As the majority notes, the Commissioner apparently realized the 
possible "loophole" in the regulations and enacted Treas. Reg. S 1.701- 
2(a) in an apparent effort to curb such tax driven transactions as the 
ones here. See Maj. Op. at 29-30, n. 29. 
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